But 2020 would surprise me again. Just as I had been mysteriously rejected, however, I submitted my application again and was lo and behold, approved to return home! I was even fortunate enough to secure one of the last flights before all transit between China and Singapore was terminated in March. I was one of the few lucky ones – I later learned that there were many others who failed to get MOM approval or secure flight tickets after multiple attempts.
几经周折，总算顺利回坡，在住处开始了十四天大门不迈的隔离生活。作为从中国回来的重点监测对象，基本每天都会有MOM的工作人员打视频电话给我。据说如果没有及时接电话证实自己乖乖坐在家里的小板凳上，还有可能被吊销工作签证。
I made my way back to Singapore eventually and began my mandatory 14-day home quarantine. In stereotypically Singaporean fashion, I was closely monitored during this time: Government officials checked in daily via video calls. I was told ominously that my work visa could be revoked if I failed to answer the calls promptly.
在家隔离的日子一直在想，不同国情下国家政府和居民（从公民的角度又是另一回事）间最有效的信任关系应是怎样的。诚然，在这样的特殊时期，疫情的严格防控无法单纯建立在信任的基础上。
Quarantine gave me ample time to ponder how an effective trust relationship should be established between governments and foreign residents (though a citizen’s perspective would likely be different). Governments cannot ensure people’s safety during such an unprecedented public health crisis by simply trusting that everyone will behave sensibly.
确实也有很多在隔离期出门被抓到了的案例。不过这也说明即使有每天不定时视频电话的牵制，也无法完全保证接过电话的人不会出门。因此，这些措施本质上是防君子不防小人，但从效果上来看，这项政策恐怕既让君子体会到了不受信任的感觉，又没能填补小人可以钻的空子。而且，在那疫情开始发展的几个月里，公共机关每个人手都如金子般珍贵。在这样的情况下，让政府工作人员给在家隔离中的几百上千号人进行每天五分钟的视频通话是不是最行之有效的办法，在我看来还是有待商榷的。
There were cases of people caught wandering around the streets and putting others at risk when they were supposed to be in quarantine. However, the existence of such rebels also means that even if people in quarantine were spot-checked every day, they could still break the rules if they so intended At the end of the day, policies like this seem to only discipline those who are already disciplined. What is worse is that the reasonable and disciplined might feel a lack of trust from this measure, while the rule breakers would still get their opportunities to go out in between the video calls. Therefore, I’m not sure whether these daily five-minute calls to thousands of quarantined individuals is the most effective measure. Moreover, the time spent by MOM staff in conducting the calls must be a precious resource for the government during such a crisis.
同样，单方面宣布拒绝与否，不提供任何沟通渠道和调整日程的空间，新加坡政府让特殊时期因为各种各样的家庭和工作原因想要尽快回到新加坡的长期居民更加焦灼。如果是为了人群的分流，我不太清楚新加坡为什么没有采取批准合格的申请但是安排申请者不同入境时间的方法。这样政府可以规划每天入境人流量的同时，让申请者可以更好地安排交通与住宿。单方面通知拒绝或是限时许可，意味着特殊时期的每个入境申请者的旅行安排都面临很大压力。
Similarly, the one way communication of both the MOM rejection and the non-negotiable three-day limit certainly did not help already uneasy and anxious travelers during a looming pandemic (COVID-19 was officially declared a pandemic on 12 March). I wondered why other more accommodating policies were not adopted. Qualified applicants could, for example, have been granted the approvals that they deserve while also being assigned specific time periods for entry.
从我二月末回到新加坡到现在已经将近五个月，而后来的新加坡又经历了疫情的高速蔓延和封城阻断。现在正在解封的第二阶段，很多限制措施正在逐步放宽，不过最近疫情又出现了反弹。我相信我们总会找到对抗疫情的更持久解决办法，但希望在这次危机中暴露出来的一些沟通与信任的缺失不要在未来一切走向新的平衡的时候被遗忘。
It has been more than five months since I returned to Singapore in late February. During that time the country experienced soaring infection rates and subsequently implemented a national circuit breaker. Although the situation has not yet stabilised, I believe we will eventually find a way to sustainably cope with the pandemic. However, I hope that we will also take time to reflect on the long overlooked issues of communication and trust exposed by the crisis, even after we finally adjust to the post-pandemic “new normal”.
面对疫情防控的压力，国家对个人的保护和支持显得愈发重要，因此有许多人认为这场疫情带来了“国家集体主义的回归”。值得注意的是，不同个体获得的保护和支持并不相同，保护支持的具体内容、方式形式取决于个人和集体之间的关系。
The COVID-19 crisis, many argue, has led to the “return of the state”. During a crisis, one as multifaceted and all-encompassing as this one, the state’s provision and protection become ever more essential. But that provision and protection is selective, determined by our relationship to the state. No wonder then, that the pandemic has left migrant communities disproportionately affected.
新加坡政府的相关政策就是一个例子。其保护和支持的资源分配主要基于财务和经济上的考量，忽视了很多外籍居民的权利。由此也带来诸多问题，例如对被社会边缘化的客工的忽视。而这一忽视对新加坡的抗疫造成了巨大的影响——直接使之从抗疫模范变成了东南亚首个病例破万国家。详见我们两周前的推送（新加坡：防疫“典范”的盲点）。随着情况的恶化，新加坡政府“保护和支持”的排他性也越发明显。
Singapore, for instance, offers protection in a calculated, almost mercenary, manner. The city-state’s neglect of its foreign workers, who’ve lived on the periphery of society, gained Singapore yet another accolade -- from author of the world’s “COVID-19 Playbook” in February to Southeast Asia’s largest COVID-19 hotspot by April 2020. As the situation deteriorated, it became clear that the state’s full protection extends only to a select group: Citizens and Permanent Residents.
就连作为高端人才在新加坡留下工作的外籍居民也直观地感受到了这样的排他性。当然，这不是新加坡独有的现象，其他国家，例如日本和新西兰也限制了持有工作签证、为其纳税的外籍居民的入境。
Thus even “expatriates”, the highly mobile, “highly-skilled” migrants, have felt the squeeze. This is by no means a Singaporean phenomenon: countries from Japan to New Zealand have closed their doors not only to travellers but to visa-holding, tax-paying residents.
在前两周的推送里，我们聚焦了新加坡低收入客工群体的困境；这周，我们把目光转向一位在新加坡工作的中国籍“高端人才”Rae的故事。因为疫情突如其来的层层阻碍让Rae深刻感受到了她作为外籍居民这一身份的脆弱，以及相关的信任、沟通、约束等一系列问题。也促使我们更全面地反思由科技进步和全球化所成就的劳动力流动性和其背后的脆弱性。
